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On Justification and Method in
Law Reform — The Contracts (Rights of
Third Parties) Act 1999*
Andrew Phang†
The present article, whilst focusing on the English Contracts (Rights of Third
Parties) Act 1999, does not canvass the more specific details of that Act
which have been dealt with quite comprehensively elsewhere. The focus of
this article is broader and is dual in nature. It will examine, first, the
justification for the 1999 Act and, in particular, attempts to respond to the
critique that the Act is wholly anathema to the underlying justification of the
doctrine of privity itself. It will also consider whether or not the 1999 Act is an
effective improvement over the existing (as well as future) situation at
common law; in particular, this article examines the argument as to whether
the 1999 Act is (in large part) merely the common law situation in legislative
garb. It will be seen that the arguments surrounding this deceptively simple
issue are in fact rather complex and of wider relevance to the method utilised
in legislative reform as well as to the relationship between legislative reform
and common law reform. However, it will be submitted that the 1999 Act
nevertheless provides for flexibility without the risk of the loss of legitimacy
which would result if the language of the 1999 Act were unduly stretched in
order to do justice in hard cases.
Introduction
After what by any standards was an inordinate period of time,1 the English
Parliament recently passed the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999
(hereafter referred to as ‘the 1999 Act’).2 On a historical note, however, it
should also be noted that there were very real historical reasons as to why
there was such a lengthy delay (the chief of which centred on the priorities
generated by the Second World War).3 Subject, therefore, to an argument that
* I am very grateful to Professor Jack Beatson, Rouse Ball Professor of English Law in the
University of Cambridge, and Professor John Carter of the University of Sydney for their
very helpful comments and suggestions. All errors, however, remain mine alone.
† Professor of Law, Singapore Management University.
1 Indeed, as far back as 1937, the then Law Revision Committee had proposed similar
amendments but nothing was done. There have, in the interim period, been judicial calls for
legislative or judicial reform: see eg per Lord Reid in Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58 at
72 and per Lords Salmon, Keith of Kinkel and Scarman in Woodar Investment Development
Ltd v Wimpey Construction UK Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 277 at 291, 297–8 and 300–1,
respectively. One eminent commentator, however, did rightly point to the difficulties
associated with legislative reform: see F M B Reynolds, ‘Privity of Contract, the Boundaries
of Categories and the Limits of the Judicial Function’ (1989) 105 LQR 1 at 3–4. Under the
circumstances, the enactment of the 1999 statute is, on this score alone, a landmark of sorts.
2 Cap 31.
3 See the fascinating account by Professor Beatson in J Beatson, ‘Reforming the Law of
Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties? A Second Bite at the Cherry’ (1992) 45 CLP 1
at 10–15.
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will in fact be considered as part of the first main theme of the present essay,
the 1999 Act has been warmly received. Indeed, the call for reform has been
constant as it has been acute.4
The 1999 Act seeks to allow, under certain circumstances, third parties to
receive the benefit of terms of contracts to which they are, of course, not
parties. Section 1 is the key provision which allows the third party to enforce
a term of the contract either if ‘the contract expressly provides that he may’
(s 1(1)(a)) or ‘subject to subsection (2), the term purports to confer a benefit
on him’ (s 1(1)(b)). Section 1(2) itself, which (as we have just seen) qualifies
s 1(1)(b), states that the latter provision ‘does not apply if on a proper
construction of the contract it appears that the parties did not intend the term
to be enforceable by the third party’. Equally importantly, under s 1(3), ‘[t]he
third party must be expressly identified in the contract by name, as a member
of a class or as answering a particular description but need not be in existence
when the contract is entered into’. These are just some of the material parts of
s 1 itself. In addition, s 2 deals with the circumstances under which the
contracting parties may vary or rescind the contract in a situation where the
third party has the right to enforce a term of the contract under s 1. Section 3
deals with the availability of any defences or set-offs to the promisor in an
action by a third party. Section 4 states that ‘[s]ection 1 does not affect any
right of the promisee to enforce any term of the contract’ whilst s 5 provides
the promisor with protection from double liability. Specific exceptions which
prevent the third party from taking advantage of the provisions of the 1999Act
are contained in s 6, whilst supplementary provisions are to be found in s 7
(two of which (ss 7(1) and (2)) will be considered in more detail below).
Section 9 contains provisions relating to arbitration.
The extremely brief sketch in the preceding paragraph does not obviously
do justice to the substantive provisions of the 1999 Act itself. However, there
has in fact been much erudite writing on the then Bill as well as the Law
Commission Report upon which the Bill and (subsequently) Act were based,5
and it would serve no real purpose to repeat the various descriptions, analyses
as well as arguments contained therein. Indeed, the present writer would point,
in particular, to two very perceptive as well as thorough analyses of the Bill6
that detail the various difficulties that might arise not only in principle but also
in practice.7 It is true that there are a few specific issues that have not received
4 See eg the judicial pronouncements of Lord Diplock in Swain v The Law Society [1983] 1
AC 598 at 611 (referring to the doctrine of privity as ‘a blot on our law and most unjust’)
and of La Forest J in the Canadian Supreme Court decision of London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne
and Nagel Ltd [1993] 1 WWR 1 at 60–1 (referring to the doctrine as ‘that pestilential
nuisance’). Even more critical were the observations of Steyn LJ (as he then was) in
Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 68 at 76–7. And for an
excellent historical survey which also helpfully illuminates the present state of the law, see
V V Palmer, The Paths to Privity — The History of Third Party Beneficiary Contracts at
English Law, Austin & Winfield, San Francisco, 1992.
5 See Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Law Com No 242, Cm
3329, HMSO, London, 1996 (hereafter referred to as ’the Law Commission Report’).
Although the Act is somewhat different from the Bill, there is no real substantive difference
and, hence, much of the relevant literature continues to remain applicable, if not important.
6 On the continued relevance of such analyses, see the preceding note.
7 See J N Adams, D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, ‘Privity of Contract — the Benefits and
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extended treatment in the literature but, even in those instances, one can point
to at least one or two fairly comprehensive treatments of each.
For example, there remains a controversy as to whether or not the words ‘or
his nominee’ allow a person thus described (that is, a bare nominee) to obtain
enforceable rights under a contract to which he is not privy by recourse to s 1
of the 1999 Act, having regard to the specific requirements spelt out in s 1(3)
of the same Act.8 The principal decisions bearing on this particular issue are
from New Zealand and do in fact conflict with each other.9 Notwithstanding
the controversy, the better view would appear to be that of Tipping J in the
New Zealand High Court decision of Rattrays Wholesale Ltd v
Meredyth-Young & A’Court Ltd,10 where the learned judge was of the view
that a bare nominee would nevertheless obtain enforceable rights — a view
that has also been endorsed in a very recent article.11
To take just one more example (for these issues are not the main focus of
the present essay), there is the very thorny issue as to whether or not the
exclusion of s 2(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 from the ambit of
the 1999 Act is justifiable.12 The Law Commission itself conceded that the
arguments were finely balanced.13 There is, however, a very cogent critique of
the decision to exclude this provision which is rather complex and involved,
and which basically centres on a few key arguments:14 first, that to disallow
the third party the possible reliance on s 2(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act
Burdens of Law Reform’ (1997) 60MLR 238 (see also Butterworths Common Law Series —
The Law of Contract, Butterworths, London, 1999, pp 934–58) as well as G H Treitel in
Chitty on Contracts, 28th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1999, pp 1003–17 (see also his The
Law of Contract, 10th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1999, pp 538–9 and 600–14),
respectively. See also A Burrows, ‘Reforming Privity of Contract: Law Commission Report
No 242’ [1996] LMCLQ 467. Very useful commentaries published after the passage of the
1999 Act are N Andrews, ‘Strangers to Justice No Longer: The Reversal of the Privity Rule
Under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999’ [2001] CLJ 353; M Bridge, ‘The
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999’ (2001) 5 Edinburgh L Rev 85; and
C MacMillan, ‘A Birthday Present for Lord Denning: The Contracts (Rights of Third
Parties) Act 1999’ (2000) 63 MLR 721. See also A Burrows, ‘The Contracts (Rights of Third
Parties) Act 1999 and Its Implications for Commercial Contracts’ [2000] LMCLQ 540. And
see now the very valuable collection of essays in R Merkin (ed), Privity of Contract — The
Impact of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, Lloyd’s of London Press,
London, 2000, as well as in P Kincaid (ed), Privity — Private Justice or Public Regulation,
Ashgate, Aldershot, 2001. Insofar as the former work is concerned, particular attention
might be paid to Ch 5 (entitled ‘Contracts (Rights of third Parties) Act 1999’ by R Merkin).
8 Section 1(3) of the 1999 Act reads as follows: ‘The third party must be expressly identified
in the contract by name, as a member of a class or as answering a particular description but
need not be in existence when the contract is entered into’.
9 See generally J F Finn, J Burrows and S M D Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand — A
Successor to Cheshire & Fifoot’s Law of Contract, 8th New Zealand edition, Butterworths,
Wellington, 1997, pp 486–7 and 489–90 as well as the Law Commission Report at
paras 8.3–8.4.
10 [1997] 2 NZLR 363.
11 See T M Yeo, ‘When Do Third Party Rights Arise Under the Contracts (Rights of Third
Parties) Act 1999 (UK)?’ (2001) 13 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 34 at 39–42. See
also the Law Commission Report at paragraphs 8.3–8.4.
12 See s 7(2) of the 1999 Act.
13 See, especially, paras 13.12 and 13.13 of the Law Commission Report.
14 See generally Adams, Beyleveld and Brownsword, above, n 7 at 258–63. See also
Butterworths Common Law Series — The Law of Contract, above, n 7 at 952–5 and Merkin,
‘Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999’, above, n 7 at 130–1.
34 (2002) 18 Journal of Contract Law
against the defendant who seeks to rely on a contractual provision attempting
to exclude or restrict its liability would lead to unevenness in the law (for
instance, where the third party also had an action in tort and could therefore
rely on s 2(2), whereas he could not if the action were launched only under the
auspices of the 1999Act). Second, to allow the third party the benefit of s 2(2),
if applicable, would not diminish the power of the contracting parties to
regulate their relationship with the third party not only because the respect
under the 1999 Act is for the joint intentions of the parties only and not (as in
this instance) for the intentions of only one party but also because the
defendant ought not to be allowed to invoke what is in effect a bad defence
against the third party.
However, my purpose here is not to canvass the more specific details as
well as difficulties that arise from the 1999 Act. As I have already mentioned,
these have been dealt with quite comprehensively elsewhere. Instead, the
central thrust of this essay is much broader and is dual in nature. Indeed, the
very nature of the inquiry might possibly impact on reforms in other areas of
the law. As the title of this essay suggests, I will examine, first, the justification
for the 1999 Act. Despite being in an ostensible minority, one writer has
continued to argue that the Act is totally at odds with the justification that
resulted in the privity rule in the first instance; indeed, he goes further and
argues that the English Parliament has, in effect, introduced a totally different
justification altogether — one that looks to societal goals rather than
individual freedom.15 This approach has, to the best of the present writer’s
knowledge, received virtually no substantive response.16 This is to be
regretted because the arguments proffered are persuasive, although I shall
attempt to show that the situation is not as unpromising as that writer thinks.
It might be argued that given the widespread dissatisfaction with the present
blanket rule against allowing third parties to claim the benefit of contracts and
the resultant legislative response in the form of the 1999 Act, it is pointless to
resurrect debate, at least at the present time. It is submitted, however, that the
fact of widespread dissatisfaction does not necessarily entail the normative
correctness of such dissatisfaction. It is further submitted that,
notwithstanding the enactment of the 1999 Act, if that Act is indeed premised
on foundations of sand, that point ought not to go unanswered. As it happens,
I hope to demonstrate that the foundations are not as fragile as one might be
led to think and that the situation is, at best, an arguable one. There may also
be a practical point to discussion of this theme in comparative context. The
Singapore Parliament, for example, has very recently enacted legislation
modelled on the 1999 Act.17 And one cannot rule out the possibility of other
common law jurisdictions adopting a similar course of action. Indeed, both
15 See generally (for his most recent pieces) P Kincaid, ‘The UK Law Commission’s Privity
Proposals and Contract Theory’ (1994) 8 JCL 51 and, by the same author, ‘Privity and
Private Justice in Contract’ (1997) 12 JCL 47 and ‘Privity Reform in England’ (2000) 116
LQR 43. It should be noted that a similar approach is adopted by S A Smith, ‘In Defence of
the Third-Party Rule’ (1997) 17 OJLS 643.
16 Though cf J Swan, ‘The Rights of Third Parties to Contracts: A Suggested Basis for
Recognition’ in Kincaid (ed), above, n 7, Ch 11 and A J Waters, ‘Privity, Property, and
Pragmatism — Can American Law Answer Kincaid’s Questions?’, ibid, Ch 14.
17 See the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 2001 (Act No 39 of 2001).
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New Zealand and certain Australian jurisdictions had already enacted
legislation reforming the doctrine of privity prior to the enactment of the 1999
Act.18 It would therefore be of at least some practical significance as to
whether or not one could justify the underlying rationale of the Act itself.
I will also attempt to demonstrate (as my second main theme) that,
notwithstanding the at least plausible justification of the privity reform
effected by the 1999 Act, there may nevertheless be raised at least possible
questions as to whether or not the resultant legislative amendments to the
landscape of privity are an effective improvement over the existing (as well as,
it might be added, future) situation at common law. It might be noted at this
point that the 1999 Act itself preserves the existing common law (as well as
statutory) exceptions in any event.19 I consider, in particular, the argument as
to whether the 1999 Act is (in large part) merely the common law situation in
legislative garb. This issue is, in fact, rather more complex than appears at first
blush and here we will find the intersection of both doctrine and theory as we
seek to resolve the latter in order to aid a practical outworking of the former.
However, I do also argue that, notwithstanding this difficult issue, there is
nevertheless more than a little merit in having the 1999 Act. Again, it should
be noted that the practical significance in comparative context as mentioned in
the preceding paragraph would also apply.
On Justification
As mentioned above, one writer, Peter Kincaid, has argued, with great force
and commitment, that any attempt to allow third parties to enforce terms of
contracts to which they are not parties is wholly anathema to the underlying
justification of the doctrine of privity itself: which is to uphold the bargain
entered into between the original parties to the contract. A third party is, ex
hypothesi, not a participant as such in the original bargain and, hence, any
conferment of a benefit on it would be a derogation from the principle of
individual freedom and could only be justified, if at all, by the principle of
societal efficiency. If so, the entire justification would have undergone a
sea-change.20
The argument, very briefly summarised in the preceding paragraph, is not
without force. It should be noted at the outset what the learned author is not
arguing for: he is not, at least as we understand it, arguing that third parties
should never be allowed to benefit from terms of contracts to which they are
not parties. What he does appear to be arguing is, at the risk of some
repetition, that the justification for benefiting such third parties must be
radically changed as well: from an individual paradigm to a communitarian or
societal one instead. He also appears to be unhappy with this shift as it is one
that departs from the very rationale of contract law itself — the idea of a
bargain in which promises are made from one party to the other and where,
ex hypothesi, third parties must, perforce, be excluded. It is indeed true that
the reform effected by the 1999 Act does not, at first blush at least, conform
18 The salient provisions are very usefully collected in the Law Commission Report at
Appendix B.
19 See s 7(1).
20 See generally above, n 15.
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to this idea. Can it be argued that by giving effect to the intentions of the
original parties,21 the provisions of the Act are thereby simultaneously giving
effect to the bargain itself? Kincaid argues that this is not in fact the situation:
the bargain as such is between the original parties to the contract and it is they
(and they alone) who ought to be allowed to enforce the terms of the contract.
What the Act does, on the other hand, is to permit the third party to enforce
the terms of the contract; unfortunately, however, it is not a party to the
bargain itself. It is admitted at the outset that this is not an argument to which
an effective response is immediately forthcoming. Indeed, Kincaid is by no
means a lone voice in this regard.22
As a first response, one might well ask whether the 1999 Act undermines
the concept of a bargain to begin with. It could be argued that by giving effect
to the intentions of the parties (to confer a benefit on the third party), the
legislature (under the 1999 Act) is simultaneously giving effect to the bargain
between the said parties, which indeed constitutes the basis of the Act itself.23
The fact that the third party benefits may be viewed as the consequence of
giving effect to the said bargain between the original parties.24 It is true that
whilst it is, in a sense, the third party seeking to enforce a contract when he
or she did not even participate in the bargain between the original parties, this
is only one way of characterising the process and that an alternative way of
characterising the process is as stated at the outset of the present paragraph. It
may be further stated that, at the very least, neither characterisation is
obviously more persuasive than the other.
Second, it may also be argued that, whilst a popular concept and notion,
bargain is not the only basis for the enforcement of a promise.25 In other
words, and as Sir Anthony Mason has very persuasively argued, there is no
magic in the bargain theory per se.26 Professor Robert Flannigan has helpfully
canvassed the various possible theories in his oft-cited article.27 Indeed, as the
learned author perceptively points out, the bargain theory of contract is no
21 See the Law Commission Report at para 1.8; reference may also be made to paras 3.1, 3.28,
6.15, 9.39, 10.15, 12.5, 13.10 and 7.1 et seq.
22 See also the views of Professor Brian Coote in his article, ‘Consideration and the Joint
Promisee’ [1978] CLJ 301 as well as M P Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law
of Contract, 14th ed, Butterworths, London, 2001, pp 86–8.
23 See the Law Commission Report at para 1.8; reference may also be made to paras 3.1, 3.28,
6.15, 9.39, 10.15, 12.5, 13.10 and 7.1 et seq. Looked at in this light, the personal element
central to the concept of contractual obligations (and see Smith, above, n 15) has not been
undermined. It is true that Smith, above, n 15 argues that in such a situation, the intention
of the contracting parties goes towards determining the content of the parties’ agreement.
However, one cannot draw too stark a distinction between content on the one hand and
bargain on the other. Indeed, there is no reason in principle why both content and bargain
have not been thus addressed simultaneously by the contracting parties in arriving at the
agreement they have.
24 Cf also F E Dowrick, ‘A Jus Quaestium Tertio by way of Contract in English Law’ (1956)
19 MLR 374 at 390. Reference may also be made to Law Commission, Privity of Contract:
Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties — Consultation Paper No 121, 1991 (hereafter
referred to as ‘the Law Commission Consultation Paper’), para 4.4.
25 See eg the views of Professor K C T Sutton in ‘Promises and Consideration’ in Ch 2 of
P D Finn (ed), Essays on Contract, Law Book Co, Sydney, 1987, especially p 40.
26 See Sir AMason, ‘Privity —ARule in Search of Decent Burial?’ in Kincaid (ed), above, n 7,
Ch 5, p 100. See also Swan, above, n 16, pp 246 ff.
27 See R Flannigan, ‘Privity — The End of an Era (Error)’ (1987) 103 LQR 564 at 582 ff.
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more than the will theory, which has the doctrine of consideration
superimposed upon it as an additional requirement.28 This point is especially
significant for at least two reasons. First, if — as I shall briefly point out
below29 — the doctrine of consideration can be demonstrated to be either
redundant or emaciated, the will theory must necessarily constitute the main
theoretical basis under the law of contract. This leads us to a second — and
closely related — point: if, in fact, the will theory is the principal theoretical
basis, then the reform effected by the 1999 Act is entirely consistent with and
is, indeed, premised upon this theory as it gives (as we have seen) effect to the
will of the contracting parties themselves.
Even assuming, however, that the bargain theory is still considered to be the
centrepiece of the law of contract, a number of difficulties arise. In the first
instance, the argument in favour of the bargain theory is justifiable only if one
also assumes that consideration must simultaneously be furnished by a party
who is eligible to claim under the bargain. Indeed, this is precisely what
Kincaid endorses, who views consideration as the necessary ‘price’ that has to
be paid in return for enforcement.30 Such an approach in fact raises the vexed
issue as to whether privity and consideration are separate requirements or
whether (in contrast) they are merely two sides of the same coin which
therefore have both to be satisfied. Kincaid’s argument is premised on the
latter. Case law, however, appears to treat both requirements as related but
separate.31 This, in and of itself, is not conclusive, if nothing else because
reasons are necessary in order to make out a convincing case. In this regard,
one may have regard to the arguments of Professors Deryck Beyleveld and
Roger Brownsword, who persuasively argue that privity and consideration are
not necessarily connected.32 They do, in fairness, concede that the argument
that privity and consideration are necessarily connected (are, in other words,
two sides of the same coin) is by no means an unintelligible one.33 However,
they must surely be correct in stating that there is nothing in principle that
mandates a necessary connection between the two doctrines. Indeed, as they
point out, the general rule that ‘consideration must move from the promisee’
is by no means contravened since consideration has been furnished by the
promisee in the contract itself.34 To argue that the ‘promisee’ is the third party
beneficiary who has not furnished consideration is not wholly unpersuasive
28 See Flannigan, above, n 27 at 584 (‘[B]argain theory is a combination of will theory and the
concept of consideration . . . ’).
29 See the main text to below, n 56 ff.
30 See generally the pieces by Kincaid cited at n 15, above.
31 See eg the leading House of Lords decision of Dunlop v Selfridge [1915] AC 847 as well as
the no less significant Australian High Court decision of Coulls v Bagot’s Executor and
Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460; [1967] ALR 635. Reference may also be made to the
(also) Australian High Court decision of Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros
Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107 at 115 and 164, per Mason CJ and Wilson J (in a joint
judgment) and Toohey J, respectively as well as the Canadian Supreme Court decision of
London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd [1993] 1 WWR 1 at 28, per
Iacobucci J (L’Heureux-Dube´, Sopinka and Cory JJ concurring).
32 See D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, ‘Privity, Transitivity and Rationality’ (1991) 54 MLR
48 at 60–1.
33 See Beyleveld and Brownsword, above, n 32 at 60.
34 See Beyleveld and Brownsword, above, n 32 at 61.
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but, at this juncture, it should be noted that there is no definitive argument that
enables us to ascertain, once and for all, which ‘definition’ of a ‘promisee’ is
more persuasive. What is clear, however, is the fact that the third party is not
seeking to enforce a totally gratuitous promise; the requisite consideration has
been provided, although it did not furnish it.35 Indeed, the situation
contemplated by the 1999 Act is not one where it is sought to enforce a
promise that is purely gratuitous; in the apt words of the Law Commission in
its Consultation Paper, ‘there is a bargain, and the promisor’s promise has
been ‘paid for’ albeit not by the third party. This explains the apparent
anomaly that the gratuitous third party has rights which the gratuitous
promisee does not have. The gratuitous third party has rights under a valid
contract, whereas in the case of a gratuitous promisee there is, ex hypothesi,
no valid contract’.36 In a related vein, it has been (in my view, persuasively)
argued that ‘[e]ven if the strict bargain theory of contracts is perforce
accepted, once [the promisor] has been paid for his promise, why should not
[the third party] as well as [the promisee] be entitled to enforce it? It is
arguable that it is the purchase of the promise, rather than the source of the
price, which is logically the most essential ingredient of any bargain theory’.37
It is also relevant to note the related point that the definition of ‘consideration’
itself is not wholly unambiguous. On the one hand, if the requirement of
consideration may be satisfied as being either a benefit conferred on the
promisor and/or a detriment suffered by the promisee,38 the argument that
consideration must be furnished by the beneficiary claiming under the contract
is much less persuasive. If, on the other hand, the requirement of consideration
is only deemed to be satisfied when the beneficiary itself has personally
‘purchased’ the promise, then, indeed, the doctrines of consideration and
privity become but two sides of the same coin.39 This latter approach of course
correlates with the strict bargain theory of contracts and is, again, met by the
arguments considered above.
Indeed, on a broader policy level, various writers have pertinently pointed
out that the doctrines of consideration and privity perform different functions:
the former relates to the enforcement of the contract (that is, what types of
promise can be enforced) whilst the latter relates to who can sue under the
contract.40 In an ideal situation, the person entitled to sue under the contract
would also have furnished the requisite consideration. And it is this ideal
situation that writers such as Kincaid are endorsing. However, and we return
to the point made above, there is nothing writ in stone that mandates the
enforcement of such an approach and pattern; or — at the risk of repetition —
35 See Beyleveld and Brownsword, above, n 32 at 61.
36 See the Law Commission Consultation Paper, para 4.4. Cf also the Law Commission Report,
especially para 6.15.
37 See G Samuels, ‘Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties’ (1968) 8 UWALR 378 at 400
(emphasis added).
38 See the classic statement of this principle in the oft-cited decision of Curry v Misa (1875)
LR 10 Exch 153 at 162, per Lush J.
39 And see R Merkin, ‘Historical Introduction to the Law of Privity’ in Ch 1 of Merkin (ed),
above, n 7, especially pp 12 and 18–19.
40 See Beyleveld and Brownsword, above, n 32 at 61; see also the Law Commission
Consultation Paper, paras 2.9 and 4.4. Reference may also be made to Flannigan, above,
n 27 at 586–7. Cf, from an historical perspective, Palmer, above, n 4.
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there is no necessary connection as such between consideration on the one
hand and privity of contract on the other: whilst both are indeed essential at
common law, they are nevertheless distinct rules.
There is, however, another view that adopts a contrary approach and (in
essence) puts forward the argument to the effect that the ‘crystallisation test’
(under s 2 of the 1999 Act) contradicts the avowed purpose to fulfil the
intentions and expectations of the contracting parties and effaces the
distinction between a third party beneficiary and a gratuitous promisee.41
However, this argument is only operative, as it were, after a certain line is
crossed and ‘crystallisation’ takes place and may, in any event, lose its force
if the argument that the doctrine of consideration has been seriously
undermined and even ought to be abolished is accepted.42 In addition, the
author herself acknowledges that there are possible arguments that may be
raised against her thesis.43
If, however, the 1999 Act can be justified on the grounds proffered above,
and the argument that the doctrines of consideration and privity are not merely
two sides of the same coin, could it nevertheless be argued that the
independent doctrine of consideration would still operate in order to prevent
the third party from obtaining the benefit of the contract simply because
consideration has not moved from the promisee (here, the plaintiff third
party)?44 In this regard, we note that the Law Commission initially proposed
an amendment that would make it clear that such an obstacle would not be
present.45 However, the Law Commission, in note 8 accompanying that
particular recommendation, expressed the view and conclusion that:
After discussions with the draftsman, we are satisfied that this recommendation will
automatically be met by the central clause of the legislation [see now section 1]
which gives a third party a right to enforce the contract; such a clause can only be
interpreted as also reforming the rule that consideration must move from the
promisee (where that rule means that consideration must move from the plaintiff).46
There is merit in the Law Commission’s reasoning because the very
presence of the reform itself (in favour of the third party) must necessarily
entail modification of the general rule that consideration must move from the
promisee (here, the plaintiff). In this regard, one might usefully note the
Supreme Court of Western Australia decision of Westralian Farmers Co-op
Ltd v Southern Meat Packers Ltd,47 where the court rejected the attempt to
raise (in the context of the relevant Western Australian legislation) the
argument from consideration which (if successful) would have significantly
41 See C Mitchell, ‘Privity Reform and the Nature of Contractual Obligations’ (1999) 19
LS 229.
42 See the main text accompanying below, n 56 ff.
43 See Mitchell, above, n 41, especially at 240–1 and 244.
44 I do not consider here the joint promisee doctrine (see, in particular, Coulls v Bagot’s
Executor and Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460; [1967] ALR 635); this doctrine raises
fairly finely balanced issues, which therefore led the Law Commission to make no positive
pronouncement on the doctrine although it was obviously quite favourably disposed towards
the doctrine: see the Law Commission Report, paras 6.10–6.11. Contra Coote, above, n 22.
45 See the Law Commission Report, para 6.8.
46 See the Law Commission Report, para 6.8, n 8.
47 [1981] WAR 241.
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undermined the whole thrust of the legislation itself.48 In the words of
Kennedy J, ‘I do not think that Parliament intended a beneficiary to escape
from the Scylla of the doctrine of privity only to encounter the Charybdis of
consideration’.49 On the other hand, there are express legislative clarifications
in both s 55 of the Queensland Property Law Act 197450 as well as s 8 of the
New Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act 1982.51 However, as I have already
argued, such express provisions are really unnecessary and would, in my view,
have been inserted ex abudante cautela. Nonetheless, the Singapore
Parliament adopted the ‘safer’ route and included a provision (s 2(5))
attempting to make it clear that the rule that consideration must move from the
promisee would not prevent the third party from enforcing the terms of a
contract by virtue of the relevant statute itself.52 There may possibly be a
difficulty with the precise language utilised as (consistently with the
corresponding Queensland as well as New Zealand legislation referred to
above), the term ‘volunteer’ is utilised. This could possibly refer only to the
more limited equitable context53 and, if so, might not actually fulfil the
original purpose which was to meet any objections from the argument that
consideration at common law has not been furnished by the third party.54
However, insofar as the Singapore context is concerned, it is suggested that
there would be no problem because, as we have seen, the clarifying wording
was probably unnecessary to begin with and there is, in any event, a need as
always to give effect to the legislative intent behind the statutory language
utilised. Equally importantly, perhaps, is the Explanatory Statement to the Bill
itself which states that clause (now, section) 2(5) defines a ‘volunteer’ as
someone who ‘has not furnished consideration’.55
It should also be noted that there has, in any event, been a serious
undermining of the doctrine of consideration, particularly in the light of the
English Court of Appeal decision in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls
(Contractors) Ltd.56 Put simply, if, in fact, mere factual (as opposed to legal57)
benefit or detriment is sufficient in the eyes of the law, then this principle,
48 See [1981] WAR 241 especially at 245–6 and 251.
49 See [1981] WAR 241 at 251.
50 See, in particular, subss (1) and (3)(a) thereof. Reference may now also be made to s 56(1)
and (3)(a) of the Law of Property Act 2000 of the Northern Territory of Australia.
51 See also N H Andrews, ‘Reform of the Privity Rule in English Contract Law: The Law
Commission’s Report No 242’ [1997] CLJ 25 at 27, with regard to the avoidance of any
objection based on the maxim that ‘equity will not assist a volunteer’ and which is raised
against attempts by third parties to enforce remedies encompassed within the ambit of s 1 of
the 1999 Act.
52 Section 2(5) of the Singapore Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 2001 (Act No 39 of
2001) reads as follows (emphasis added): ‘For the purpose of exercising his right to enforce
a term of the contract, there shall be available to the third party any remedy that would have
been available to him in an action for breach of contract if he had been a party to the contract
(and the rules relating to damages, injunctions, specific performance and other remedy shall
apply accordingly) and such remedy shall not be refused on the ground that, as against the
promisor, the third party is a volunteer’.
53 See Andrews, above, n 51.
54 I owe this point to Associate Professor Yeo Tiong Min of the Faculty of Law at the National
University of Singapore.
55 See the Republic of Singapore Government Gazette Bills Supplement, Notification No B 36
(26 September 2001).
56 [1991] 1 QB 1. And see generally A Phang, ‘Consideration at the Crossroads’ (1991) 107
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coupled with the related principle to the effect that consideration must be
sufficient but need not be adequate, would completely undermine the accepted
practical rationale of the doctrine: to enable the courts to distinguish between
seriously intended agreements and gift arrangements.58 There has been some
retreat from these very broad implications of the Williams case, although the
underlying reasoning is, with respect, not persuasive in the least.59 If, indeed,
the doctrine of consideration is undermined, such undermining does, of
course, simultaneously undermine the doctrine of bargain as well: at least in
the sense Kincaid supports. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that the doctrine
of consideration is so ridden with difficulties that it ought to be abolished
altogether.60
In summary, there are no persuasive reasons why the 1999 Act undermines
the law of contract. Indeed, as I have argued above, it actually gives effect to
the bargain between the original parties by honouring the intentions therein (to
benefit the third party). However, before leaving the argument tendered by
Kincaid, it would be appropriate to deal with his argument (briefly referred to
at the outset of this Part) that conferment of a benefit on a third party is a
derogation from the principle of individual freedom and can only be justified,
if at all, by the principle of societal efficiency. One key premise underlying
such a view is that individual freedom on the one hand and societal efficiency
on the other are, at least more often than not, at odds with each other.
However, I would argue that such a tension is not as inevitable or as
intractable as would appear at first blush.61 Individual freedom, for example,
is a necessary prerequisite to the creativity and entrepreneurship that is so
essential to the promotion of societal welfare, particularly in the context of the
new economy. The real issue, it suggested, is not so much having to ascertain
which side of the spectrum we support but, rather, ascertaining, instead, how
to integrate via balancing individual rights on the one hand and societal
welfare as well as efficiency on the other. This is, of course, by no means an
easy task and would entail consideration of the closely related (and even more
basic) issue as to whether or not objective standards are possible in the first
instance.62 This is obviously too vast an issue to deal with within the more
modest confines of this essay.63 However, it is a very real issue which would
aid us in drawing the line in order to ensure not only that a minimum level of
human freedom and integrity is maintained but also that it is allowed to
flourish without simultaneously harming the common weal.
LQR 21; B Coote, ‘Consideration and Benefit in Fact and in Law’ (1992) 3 JCL 23; and
J W Carter, A Phang and J Poole, ‘Reactions to Williams v Roffey’ (1995) 8 JCL 248.
57 The classic decision in this regard is Stilk v Myrick (1809) 2 Camp 317, which whilst not
being purported to have been departed from in the Williams case, has, it is suggested, in
substance at least, been overruled by the Williams case itself. But see below, n 59.
58 See Phang, above, n 56.
59 See the (also) English Court of Appeal decision of Re Selectmove [1995] 1 WLR 474. For
critique of this decision, see A Phang, ‘Acceptance by Silence and Consideration Reined In’
[1994] LMCLQ 336.
60 See Phang, above, n 56.
61 Cf also Waters, above, n 16 at 325–7.
62 For an attempt by the present writer to argue for such standards, see A Phang, ‘Security of
Contract and the Pursuit of Fairness’ (2000) 16 JCL 158.
63 See generally Phang, above, n 62.
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One might also note that third party rights to benefits conferred under the
1999Act are in fact just that: viz, individual rights. It is true that this particular
species of rights is literally different from the rights belonging to the original
contracting parties. Yet, I would suggest that, even here, the distinctions are
not as clear-cut as they appear at first blush. In the first instance, third party
rights conferred by legislation are nevertheless, at least arguably, a species of
rights. In this regard, we might note that even individual rights take various
forms. For instance, social rights have sometimes been distinguished from
other rights and, in this regard, it has been argued that where social rights are
concerned, it is legitimate to take into account the context in which these
rights exist and are to be given effect to and that this would include
considerations of general societal policy and welfare as well.64 This might
well be an appropriate way of describing third party rights conferred under the
1999 Act, particularly when we take into account the commercial context.65
Indeed, one might even plausibly argue that economic rights are in fact social
rights in the sense just mentioned, and that such third party rights might well
be classified under this particular category of rights. It could, of course, be
argued that this really brings the inquiry outside the realm of individual rights
and into the opposing camp of societal welfare. But this argument fails, with
respect, to encompass the nuanced nature of the very concept of individual
rights itself. Indeed, as I have already argued, the line between rights and
social welfare is by no means a bright and distinct one. On the contrary, each
situation is probably a complex and integrated amalgam of both elements.
Further, the argument from social rights does not invariably result in the
emaciation of such rights, although it is true that the final result might be the
radical modification of, or even emaciation of, such rights. What is involved
here, at the expense of repetition, is a balancing process — which brings into
play (once again) the issue of whether an objective resolution is possible.
However, yet another possible argument that avoids the alleged conflict
between rights and social welfare altogether is to characterise (as we already
have) the 1999 Act as one that in reality gives effect to the individual rights
and freedom of the original contracting parties, that is, which gives effect to
their bargain freely entered into. Although simple in form, I would suggest
that it is nevertheless a powerful argument indeed. In this respect, one has to
distinguish between giving effect to the individual freedom of the original
contracting parties on the one hand and the consequences and results of that
freedom on the other. It is, of course, true that those consequences and results
would themselves form the basis of a related set of rights insofar as the third
party is concerned. However, nothing in this derogates from the individual
freedom of the contracting parties. On the contrary, if the third party were not
able to take the benefit which it was intended it should obtain by the original
64 See eg H J Steiner, ‘Social Rights and Economic Development: Converging Discourses?’
(1998) 4 Buffalo Human Rights Law Rev 25. Cf also J Donnelly, Universal Human Rights
in Theory and Practice, Cornell University Press, New York, 1989, Ch 10 (entitled
‘Development-Rights Trade-offs: Needs and Equality’). See also Arts 28–30 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
65 And cf, albeit with regard to ‘Himalaya Clauses’, The Eurymedon [1975] AC 154 and The
New York Star [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 198. See also the Law Commission Consultation Paper,
para 4.4.
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contracting parties, there would be a dual-disaster: the individual freedom of
the original contracting parties as expressed in the original bargain would fall
to the ground and the third party would be left without the benefit it was
intended that it should have; in all probability, too, the overall social welfare
would have been simultaneously diminished inasmuch as there would
probably be a failure in the overall commercial purpose sought simultaneously
to be achieved.
One broad lesson that can be gleaned from the discussion in the present Part
of the essay is that one cannot underestimate the importance of theory. Indeed,
if Kincaid’s argument is persuasive, the very theoretical basis of contract law
would have been undermined. And this would (quite apart from the need for
theoretical cogency) have, in the practical sphere, a profound impact on
contracting parties.66 Indeed, if the parties to a contract believe that the
legislature is imposing an extra regime of obligations upon them, there might
be a possible psychological and/or substantive reaction against the Act, at
least on a subconscious level. This would be most unfortunate, particularly in
certain industries (such as the construction industry67) where the express
utilisation of the 1999 Act would avoid the necessity to have recourse to
devices such as collateral warranties and would probably even save time and
expenses in the process. Another prominent example concerns the use of
‘Himalaya Clauses’, the principal catalyst for which is commercial certainty
and convenience.68 There are also implications on a comparative level as
well.69 However, as I have sought to argue, there are both conceptual as well
as doctrinal reasons as to why Kincaid’s argument, whilst not unpersuasive at
first blush, should not be accepted and that all the possible difficulties and
fears briefly canvassed in this Part of the essay are wholly unfounded.
On Method
We turn now to the second main theme of this essay: the relationship between
the 1999Act and the exceptions that are continued in force by the Act. I focus,
in particular, on the relationship between the Act and the common law
exceptions. As already mentioned, the 1999 Act preserves the existing
exceptions in s 7(1) in the following general language: ‘Section 1 does not
affect any right or remedy of a third party that exists or is available apart from
this Act’.
Indeed, the language not only preserves the existing exceptions but also
contemplates new exceptions being created. At this juncture, it might be
apposite to point out that the 1999 Act does also refer to categories of
contracts that do not fall within its purview so that third parties under such
contracts cannot take advantage of the Act.70 However, these exclusions are
66 Though cf H Beale, ‘Privity of Contract: Judicial and Legislative Reform’ (1995) 9 JCL 103
especially at 114.
67 And see generally Swan, above, n 16, pp 235 ff.
68 See above, n 65 and below, n 81.
69 See the main text to above, n 17 ff.
70 See generally s 6 of the 1999 Act.
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premised on various public policy and/or commercial grounds71 and I will not
discuss them further in the present piece as my focus is, as mentioned, on the
relationship between the Act and the existing (as well as future) exceptions
that fall outside the scope of the Act and which do allow third parties to take
the benefit of contracts to which they are not privy.
To return to the topic at hand, the issue that arises is whether or not it is
desirable for the various common law exceptions to exist side-by-side with the
1999 Act. In broader terms what is at issue here is the question of method. An
argument in favour of such an arrangement centres on the flexibility accorded
inasmuch as benefits in contracts can be accorded in law to third parties
notwithstanding that the fact situation concerned falls outside the ambit of the
1999 Act itself. To put it another way, the 1999 Act, whilst constituting a very
useful mechanism which contracting parties can utilise in order to confer
benefits on third parties, does in fact simultaneously provide (via s 7(1)) the
flexibility as well as opportunity for the courts to craft further exceptions with
respect to situations that fall outside the purview of the Act in order to fill in
the gaps, so to speak. Interestingly, the Law Commission was of the view that
some of the existing common law exceptions conferred ‘more secure rights’
than its proposed reform.72
Notable instances of situations where the courts have accorded third parties
rights at common law which they would not have received under the
provisions of the 1999 Act occur in two leading decisions. The first is the
Canadian Supreme Court decision of London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne & Nagel
International Ltd,73 which, however, gives rise to somewhat more ambiguity
on this score, for (as we shall see) it might still be possible to argue that the
facts of the case could fall within the ambit of the 1999 Act.74 In this case, the
majority of the court held that third party employees could avail themselves
of a contractual limitation clause (in a contract between their employer and the
claimant) if:
(1) the benefit of the clause was either expressly or impliedly extended
to the employees seeking to rely on it; and
(2) the employees concerned must have been acting in the course of their
employment and must have been performing the very services
provided for in the contract between their employer and the claimant
when the loss or damage occurred.
The relevant point of focus for our present purposes is the first condition
above. Although the majority of the court held that the employees had been
71 See Treitel in Chitty on Contracts, above, n 7 at 1012–14. See also generally Pt XII of the
Law Commission Report.
72 See the Law Commission Report at para 12.1. Though cf the main text to below, n 80 ff.
73 [1993] 1 WWR 1; noted by J N Adams and R Brownsword, ‘Privity of Contract — That
Pestilential Nuisance’ (1993) 56 MLR 722; C MacMillan, ‘Privity and the Third Party
Beneficiary: The “Monstrous Proposition”’ [1994] LMCLQ 22; and S M Waddams, ‘Privity
of Contract in the Supreme Court of Canada’ (1993) 109 LQR 349 (and for comment on the
Court of Appeal of British Columbia decision, see J Swan, ‘Privity of Contract and Third
Party Beneficiaries: the Selective Use of Precedent’ (1991) 4 JCL 129 and W J Swadling,
‘Privity, Tort and Contract: Exempting the Careless Employee’ (1991) 4 JCL 208).
74 See the main text accompanying, below, n 82 ff.
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impliedly extended the benefit of the clause in question75 (which might
conceivably have satisfied the requirements laid down in s 1(1) and (2) of the
1999 Act, if it had been applicable), the 1999 Act itself would probably have
been inapplicable in the final analysis because the requirement laid down in
s 1(3) would not have been satisfied as the third party had not been ‘expressly
identified in the contract’ as such.76
Another (and clearer) instance occurs in the recent House of Lords decision
in Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Panatown Ltd.77 In this case, the
claimant employer brought an action against the defendant building contractor
for damages as there had been serious defects in the building constructed by
the latter. On the same day that that (building) contract had been entered into,
the defendants had entered into a separate duty of care deed with the true
owner of the site, which also happened to be an associated company of the
claimant. The central issue raised in this case was whether the claimant could
claim substantial damages even though it was not the actual owner of the site.
The House held (by a bare majority of three to two) in favour of the
defendants, not least because the duty of care deed was perceived as giving a
direct remedy by the owner against the defendant and therefore excluded any
substantial claim by the claimant employer as such. The actual reasoning of
the majority has in fact been subject to an excellent analysis and critique by
Professor Brian Coote.78 For the purposes of the present essay, however, the
key issue is whether or not, had the 1999 Act been applicable, its provisions
could have been utilised by the third party (here, the actual owner of the site)
to obtain substantial damages. In this regard, the answer would have been
fairly straightforward: the third party would not have been able to invoke the
provisions of the 1999 Act simply because it had neither been expressly nor
impliedly conferred any such benefit under s 1 of the Act itself.79
A larger issue that arises is this: could we construe the 1999 Act as a
statutory embodiment of all the existing common law exceptions? Is, in other
words, the 1999 Act a collection of the common law exceptions in statutory
garb?80 There is, undoubtedly, a considerable overlap. Indeed, the specific
75 The material clause was s 11(b), which read as follows: ‘The warehouseman’s liability on
any one package is limited to $40 unless the holder has declared in writing a valuation in
excess of $40 and paid the additional charge specified to cover warehouse liability’.
76 See Treitel in Chitty on Contracts, above, n 7 at 1006, n 85.
77 [2000] 3 WLR 946.
78 See B Coote, ‘The Performance Interest, Panatown, and the Problem of Loss’ (2001) 117
LQR 81.
79 See also per Lord Goff: see [2000] 3 WLR 946 at 976–7.
80 Professor Treitel assumes that there is a distinction between rights under the 1999 Act and
under the common law, and works out the various permutations accordingly: see Treitel in
Chitty on Contracts, above, n 7 at 1015. Professor Merkin’s following observations also
proceed along the same lines (see Merkin, ‘Contracts (Rights of third Parties) Act 1999’,
above, n 7 at 113), although they do also provide perceptive insights into the possible
practical utilisation of the 1999 Act in relation to the existing common law exceptions of
agency and trusteeship: ‘However, it may be preferable to attempt to argue agency or
trusteeship where there is a potential insolvency and the third party seeks a proprietary
remedy against the promisee. It is likely that, this illustration apart, the rights conferred by
the 1999 Act are easier to establish than those under the pre-existing law and it is difficult
to think of situations in which the third party might do better by relying on earlier law,
although until the 1999 Act has become fully established it may be that third parties will
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exception embodied in The Eurymedon81 is but a specific application of the
general principle embodied in s 1 and its very existence is expressly preserved
not only by s 7(1) but also by s 6(5), the latter provision of which makes it
clear that the proscription against third party benefits with respect to carriage
of goods by sea does not extend to the contractual exclusion or limitation of
liability as such.
The fact situation as well as potential application in the Panatown case82 is
also consistent with the general principle embodied in s 1 of the 1999 Act
(there being, it will be recalled, no intention to confer any benefit on the third
party as such). But what, then, about the London Drugs case?83 We have seen
that the fact situation in that case would probably have fallen outside the
purview of the 1999 Act because of a lack of compliance with the requirement
laid down in s 1(3) of that Act. However, given the obvious desire by the
majority in that case to locate a benefit by implication, it is suggested that it
might have been possible to have construed the language of the clause
concerned in such a manner as to have located an express identification of the
third party employees as well; in other words, the third party warehousemen
could be said to have been expressly identified within the reference to
‘warehouseman’ in the clause itself.84 It is admitted that this does possibly
stretch the meaning of the term ‘expressly identified’ in s 1(3) of the 1999Act.
However, the entire tenor of the process engaged in by the majority in the
London Drugs case suggests that this is not a wholly unreasonable
interpretation. The judges concerned were of the view that the term
‘warehouseman’ in the clause in question should be interpreted as meaning
‘warehousemen’, thus resulting in the conclusion that the employee
warehousemen in the instant case were implied third party beneficiaries. If so,
is it not also persuasive to argue that the term ‘warehouseman’ in the clause
was an express reference to the employees concerned who were, on the facts,
also implied third party beneficiaries?85
It is, of course, possible to argue that the multifarious fact situations would
never enable any one statute to provide exhaustive coverage. Indeed, we have
only hitherto been considering existing situations and it is quite possible that
the situation would be exacerbated when potential factual scenarios are taken
into account as well. This is a very compelling argument. However, it is
suggested that it is entirely possible that the courts would not endorse an
exception at common law unless there was a datum intention to benefit the
third party in question. Indeed, a survey of the various common law
precedents across the Commonwealth (including the couple mentioned above)
would appear to suggest that this is the central common theme embedded
within these various decisions. If so, then does the 1999 Act not constitute an
continue to plead existing common law rights in the alternative’. Cf also Andrews, above,
n 7, who, however, warns of the dangers of usurpation of the legislative scheme: see at 379.
81 [1975] AC 154; see also above, n 65.
82 [2000] 3 WLR 946.
83 [1993] 1 WWR 1.
84 See above, n 75.
85 But cf the Law Commission Report, para 2.67, n 178. Cf also Adams, Beyleveld and
Brownsword, above, n 7 at 246. Reference may also be made to Waddams, above, n 73
at 350.
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umbrella doctrine, albeit in statutory form? Could it also not be argued that the
differences in actual results can be traced not to a difference in basic principle
as such but, rather, to the different results that occur in the context of the
application of a central core principle? In other words, the difference in result
is not a manifestation of different principles of law as such but, rather, a
manifestation of the differences one obtains when applying the same principle
of law and/or an indirect means is formulated instead.86
However, it is also true that whilst the 1999 Act contains a core principle,
the precise language of the various provisions in the Act itself may in fact
(whether intentionally or otherwise) actually result in a specific exception that
might not capture all the possible factual scenarios: at which point a new
exception altogether might be required to be formulated at common law.
There is no easy answer to this complex conceptual question. It is suggested
that the ‘core principle’ argument coupled with differences that result from
actual application is not a wholly unconvincing one, bearing in mind the fact
that the line between principle (or rule) and application is not one writ in stone
and, indeed, should be viewed as a holistic and integrated process. It is
precisely the holistic nature of the enterprise that leads to the ambiguities just
canvassed. This might also meet, to some extent at least, Professor Beatson’s
concern that to allow judicial development of the common law exceptions
would be to go further than what Parliament intended, which is to allow third
parties the right to enforce a contract only where the contracting parties so
intend — an approach which, in his view, ‘involves matters of policy which
are . . . more suitable for a legislative than a judicial determination’.87 The line
between principle and policy88 is, of course, not always a distinct one and it
is true that judges often cannot avoid the inclusion of policy arguments in their
judgments. However, if the common law exceptions can be argued to be
consistent with the core principle which seeks to fulfil the intention of the
contracting parties, the danger of ‘judicial transgression’ becomes less, even
non-existent.
There are, however, arguments that militate against this argument from a
‘core principle’. It might be argued that the core principle is far too abstract,
consisting (as we have seen) in a broad intention to benefit the third party in
question. Indeed, whilst this core principle is embodied within s 1 of the 1999
Act, that provision is itself subject to other provisions in the same Act, such
as the provision requiring express identification of the third party (see s 1(3)),
provisions pertaining to the limits to which the contracting parties may vary
or rescind the contract in a manner impacting adversely on the third party’s
rights (see generally s 2) as well as provisions relating to the availability to the
promisor of contractual defences or set-offs vis-a`-vis an action brought by the
86 On this lastmentioned point, see per Lord Griffiths in Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta
Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85, whose broad principle stated therein is still
controversial and which was expressly adopted by Lords Goff and Millett in the Panatown
case [2000] 3 WLR 946, although both Law Lords thought the situation to concern the topic
of damages rather than that of privity. And see generally Coote, above, n 78.
87 See J Beatson, ‘The Role of Statute in the Development of Common Law Doctrine’ (2001)
117 LQR 247 at 268–9.
88 See eg R M Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Rev Ed, Harvard University Press, 1978,
Ch 4.
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third party pursuant to his or her rights under the Act (see generally s 3).
However, it should be noted that even in these instances, the contracting
parties generally possess the power to shape the third party rights in question
(see, for instance, ss 2(3) and 3(5)). It is true, though, that there could, with
respect to application of these various provisions of the 1999 Act, be quite
different results which may themselves be construed as specific ‘exceptions’
in their own right. However, this merely pushes back, a stage further, the
argument already considered — that the various provisions in the 1999 Act
might actually result in a specific exception that might not capture all the
possible factual scenarios. In other words, the interplay and application of the
various provisions of the Act to the various fact situations results, possibly, in
more than one (specific) exception. However, it is submitted that even at this
juncture, there is, arguably at least, no way in which the application of the
various provisions of the 1999 Act can capture all the possible factual
scenarios. The interpretation just considered merely suggests the capturing of
a few more such scenarios. Nevertheless, this still leaves the way open for new
common law exceptions that will need to respond to the factual scenarios not
hitherto covered. It might be argued, at this juncture, that these new common
law exceptions are different from the specific exceptions generated by the
1999 Act because the specific requirements resulting from the interplay of the
various provisions in the latter may well differ from the requirements within
the new common law exception, notwithstanding the commonality
encompassed within the ‘core principle’ of an intention to benefit the third
party concerned. However, it could equally well be argued that the
multifarious fact situations would always result in different specific
consequences (particularly in the sphere of application, whether in a statutory
or common law context) and that this does not, nevertheless detract from the
commonality that is embodied within the ‘core principle’ itself. The difficulty
is, at bottom, one of the inevitable tension between universality on the one
hand and specificity on the other. This does not mean that the universal
principle (here, the ‘core principle’ centring on the datum intention to benefit
the third party in question) is necessarily invalid. Indeed, as we have seen, this
‘core principle’ certainly appears to be a common theme running across not
only the 1999 Act but also the various common law principles as well.
However, there is, notwithstanding this commonality, the practical problem of
specific application. At this juncture, however, it is entirely possible, owing to
the limits of logical discourse as we know it, for the line between specific
application of a general ‘core principle’ and the creation of a specific new
exception (whether by application of the salient provisions of the 1999 Act or
by way of development of the common law) to be blurred. Notwithstanding
the lack of conceptual clarity, however, I would reiterate the argument to the
effect that even if new common law exceptions are created, the ‘core
principle’ (and resultant commonality) would still operate — hence (as
already argued), minimising (if not avoiding altogether) charges of ‘judicial
transgression’.
It is submitted, however, that (in the final analysis) the absence of a
definitive answer is generally no great obstacle in the practical sphere. Given
the ambiguities, and the simultaneous need for flexibility, it is suggested that
the approach adopted by the English Parliament in preserving both existing as
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well as future exceptions outside the Act itself is the most practical approach
to adopt. One should never lose sight of the key aims of the law in this area,
which is to achieve justice within the framework of commerce and
commercial expectations. It is true that a purposive (and, on occasion, even
‘creative’) interpretation as well as application of the provisions of the 1999
Act could achieve the same results if the Act were the only route retained in
order to confer benefits of contracts on third parties. However, allowing for
exceptions beyond the scope of the 1999 Act, whilst not the most elegant
solution, allows for the same amount of flexibility without the risk of the loss
of legitimacy if the language of the Act is stretched in order to do justice in
a hard case. There is, of course, a possible loss of legitimacy if new exceptions
at common law are created to accommodate a hard case, but this is likely to
be perceived as less unacceptable compared to the undue stretching of
legislative language. Further, such an approach may well be preferable
(particularly from the perspective of legitimacy) to one which frees judges
from the constraints of the privity rule altogether and which allows the courts
to enforce third party rights where it is thought appropriate.89
What bears repeating is the need for flexibility and, looked at in this light,
the approach adopted in the 1999 Act is a practical one: at least until such a
time when we are clear as to what the precise relationship between the Act
itself and the common law exceptions is. However, the experience and issues
raised by the 1999 Act will undoubtedly be of wider relevance with regard to
the method utilised in legislative reform and the relationship between
legislative reform on the one hand and common law reform on the other.90
Indeed, in very specific and specialised areas of law reform, there might be the
need for the resultant legislative reform to be the exclusive instrument for
dealing with that particular area of the law.
89 This was in fact the recommendation of the Ontario Law Reform Commission which
recommended that ‘[t]here should be enacted a legislative provision to the effect that
contracts for the benefit of third parties should not be unenforceable for lack of consideration
or want of privity’: see the Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Amendment of the
Law of Contract, Ministry of the Attorney General, Ontario, 1987, p 71; see also ibid, p 69
(cf also Swan, above, n 16). As the Manitoba Law Reform Commission points out, however,
although there is the advantage of flexibility, there is ‘the inevitable period of uncertainty
and unpredictability while authorities accumulate, the need for expensive litigation to
resolve even those issues that are capable of clear and easy solution (defences, joinder, etc),
the abdication of legislative responsibility to provide some guidance in the resolution of
difficult issues and the undervaluation of contract law as a planning device requiring a high
degree of certainty and predictability of legal principles’: see the Manitoba Law Reform
Commission, Privity of Contract, 1993, p 57. In addition, the possible difficulties raised by
the Ontario Law Reform Commission centring on the definition of the class of beneficiaries
entitled to sue and the problem of modification or rescission by the original parties has, it is
suggested, been amply met by the relevant provisions in the 1999 Act itself.
90 A threshold issue is, of course, whether the legislative route is the best route to take in the
first instance. In this regard, Professor Reynolds’s observation that ‘[s]hort statutes cutting
knots in which the law finds itself can be satisfactory, but requires topics that are very
discrete’ is compelling: see F M B Reynolds, ‘Contract: Codification, Legislation and
Judicial Development’ (1995) 9 JCL 11 at 27. Indeed, the reform of the privity rule is one
such discrete area.
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Conclusion
The two themes considered in the present essay are not of merely theoretical
interest. The first goes to the very core of our understanding as to what the law
of contract is and which might have a profound psychological impact with
very practical consequences. I have sought to demonstrate, however, that the
1999 Act does not in fact undermine the law of contract and is, indeed, a
reform to be welcomed. So, also, with regard to the second theme: the
retention of exceptions despite the passage of the 1999 Act gives sufficient
flexibility to the courts to do justice in a rational fashion and this is especially
important in the light of the ambiguity that exists on a conceptual level. Where
such ambiguity exists, the preferable route is to adopt an approach that allows
the courts to achieve justice with the minimum loss of legitimacy and the
maximum gain in flexibility, especially from the perspectives of the respective
parties themselves.
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